Epistemic absolutism that can accommodate the relativist's intuition
By investigating the argument from underdetermination and the argu- ment from norm-circularity and by showing that both arguments do not provide reasons for subscribing to epistemic relativism I have shown that we have no reason to subscribe to epistemic relativism. If we follow the setting of the discussion between the epistemic relativist and the epistemic absolutist that I pointed to in Section 18.104.22.168 — namely that relativism and absolutism are the only possible alternatives in play once we ask the question of the status of correctness of epistemic norms — then, we are led to conclude, we should be epistemic absolutists. However, it might be objected that my treatment of the question of epistemic relativism was only negative — what then is my own proposal?
Seidel, M. (2014). Epistemic absolutism that can accommodate the relativist's intuition, in Epistemic relativism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 192-211.
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