Statistical inference without frequentist justifications
Statistical inference is often justified by long-run properties of the sampling distributions, such as the repeated sampling rationale. These are frequentist justifications of statistical inference. I argue that these justifications are flawed. Then I propose a novel interpretation of probability in statistics, the artefactual interpretation. I believe that this interpretation is able to forge a link between statistical probability calculations and rational decisions on the basis of observed data. The artefactual interpretation is able to justify statistical inference without making any assumptions about probability as a part of the natural world.
Sprenger, J. (2010)., Statistical inference without frequentist justifications, in M. Surez, M. Dorato & M. Rédei (eds.), Epsa epistemology and methodology of science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 289-297.
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