Willard and Husserl on logical form
An awful perplexity gripped me upon receiving the title of Professor Willard's paper. I had no idea whether to expect a series of off-color remarks about logically true sentences or — perhaps even worse — a serious attempt to ground the notion of logical form in perceptible colors. How would I handle the former, and what could I say about the latter, a position I was convinced no one could actually believe? I was not greatly consoled by the abstract of Professor Willard's paper, for in it I saw suggestions that some believed logical form to be perceptible shape — a position which suffers, as Professor Willard points out, from precisely the same difficulties as the one I feared he might present. Needless to say, I was reassured only by his announcement that he was going to argue against this view.
Drummond, J. (1991)., Willard and Husserl on logical form, in T. M. Seebohm, D. Føllesdal & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Phenomenology and the formal sciences, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 243-255.
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