Despair and the determinate negation of Brandom's Hegel
In this paper, I contend that Brandom's interpretive oversights leave his inferentialist program vulnerable to Hegelian critique. My target is Brandom's notion of "conceptual realism," or the thesis that the structure of mind-independent reality mimics the structure of thought. I show, first, that the conceptual realism at the heart of Brandom's empiricism finds root in his interpretation of Hegel. I then argue that conceptual realism is incompatible with Hegel's thought, since the Jena Phenomenology, understood as a "way of despair," includes a critique of the philosophical framework upon which conceptual realism relies. Finally, I offer the Hegelian critique of Brandom that results from these textual infidelities.
Wretzel, J. I. (2014). Despair and the determinate negation of Brandom's Hegel. Continental Philosophy Review 47 (2), pp. 195-216.
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