Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality

John Drummond

pp. 35-49

This paper distinguishes between two senses of the term "phenomenology": a narrow sense (drawn from Nagel) and a broader sense (drawn from Husserl). It claims, with particular reference to the moral sphere, that the narrow meaning of moral phenomenology cannot stand alone, that is, that moral phenomenology in the narrow sense entails moral intentionality. The paper proceeds by examining different examples of the axiological and volitional experiences of both virtuous and dutiful agents, and it notes the correlation between the phenomenal and intentional differences belonging to these experiences. The paper concludes with some reflections on how the focus on the broader sense of "phenomenology" serves to provide a more precise sense of what we might mean by "moral phenomenology."

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-007-9064-0

Full citation:

Drummond, J. (2008). Moral phenomenology and moral intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1), pp. 35-49.

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.