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(2014) Consciousness inside and out, Dordrecht, Springer.

What is acquaintance with consciousness?

Jonathan Simon

pp. 103-118

It is a plausible thought that we are acquainted with our own phenomenal states, and that there are special canonical concepts of those states – phenomenal concepts – that in some sense or another facilitate this acquaintance. Let Acquaintance be the claim that our most general concept of phenomenal consciousness – the concept consciousness – is such a canonical concept, facilitating acquaintance with the property of being phenomenally conscious. In "Orthodox Property Dualism + The Linguistic Theory of Vagueness = Panpsychism", Phillip Goff attempts to put a version of Acquaintance to work. He first argues that Orthodox Property Dualists – those who accept Property Dualism on the basis of arguments from epistemic gaps to ontological gaps – are committed to his version of Acquaintance, which he dubs Phenomenal Transparency. He then argues that Phenomenal Transparency implies that consciousness is not a vague concept, and finally he argues that this means Orthodox Property Dualists should be Panpsychists.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_9

Full citation:

Simon, J. (2014)., What is acquaintance with consciousness?, in R. S. Brown (ed.), Consciousness inside and out, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 103-118.

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