What is acquaintance with consciousness?
It is a plausible thought that we are acquainted with our own phenomenal states, and that there are special canonical concepts of those states – phenomenal concepts – that in some sense or another facilitate this acquaintance. Let Acquaintance be the claim that our most general concept of phenomenal consciousness – the concept consciousness – is such a canonical concept, facilitating acquaintance with the property of being phenomenally conscious. In "Orthodox Property Dualism + The Linguistic Theory of Vagueness = Panpsychism", Phillip Goff attempts to put a version of Acquaintance to work. He first argues that Orthodox Property Dualists – those who accept Property Dualism on the basis of arguments from epistemic gaps to ontological gaps – are committed to his version of Acquaintance, which he dubs Phenomenal Transparency. He then argues that Phenomenal Transparency implies that consciousness is not a vague concept, and finally he argues that this means Orthodox Property Dualists should be Panpsychists.
Simon, J. (2014)., What is acquaintance with consciousness?, in R. S. Brown (ed.), Consciousness inside and out, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 103-118.
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